World at Crossroads: From Scenarios to Action
These short summaries and discussions address highly complex global, regional, and translocal developments occurring up to March 2025, involving numerous actors, perspectives, and nuances. They do not offer comprehensive accounts or detailed analyses, and inevitably may overlook certain events, developments, or viewpoints. Instead, their purpose is to help stakeholders critically engage with the four RESPACE scenarios, stimulating reflection, strategic foresight, and deeper exploration of transformative possibilities for collaboration. Each RESPACE scenario outlines distinct, plausible future pathways but is explicitly not predictive. Users are encouraged to continuously adapt and update these Dialogue Inputs to reflect evolving contexts and emerging understandings.
Balkans in Flux – Serbia and Regional Civic Unrest
May 2025
Download the article here.
Summary & Context
In late 2024, an unexpected spark ignited the largest mass protest movement in Serbian history. On 1 November 2024, the roof of a newly renovated train station in Novi Sad catastrophically collapsed, killing 15 people and injuring others. Public outrage at this tragedy – seen as a symptom of deep corruption and cronyism – quickly spread. By early 2025, Serbia had been gripped by student-led protests for four months, starting with university blockades and silent candlelight vigils but growing into nationwide demonstrations. Tens of thousands of citizens, from students and professors to farmers and bikers, poured into the streets of Belgrade and other cities each week – at least 1,697 protests happened in March alone. They demanded accountability for the disaster and denounced President Aleksandar Vučić’s increasingly authoritarian rule. The rallies in mid-March 2025 swelled to an unprecedented size: More than 100,000 people flooded central Belgrade in one gathering, the largest anti-government protest in modern Serbian history. Protesters waved Serbian flags and chanted slogans such as ‘He’s finished!’ in a carnival-like display of unity, anger and hope. After 12 years in power, Vučić faced his greatest challenge yet from a populace fed up with corruption, media censorship and abuse of power.
The government response combined concession and intimidation. Under pressure, Prime Minister Miloš Vučević, nominally the president of Vučić’s party, the SNS (Srpska napredna stranka; Serbian Progressive Party), resigned in January 2025. The Serbian parliament accepted his resignation in March, triggering a constitutional 30-day deadline to form a new government or call snap elections. This was a tactical move by Vučić to buy time and perhaps reset the political deck. Simultaneously, however, authorities have tried to paint the protests as a foreign-backed plot. Vučić publicly labelled the efforts of the demonstrators as an imported revolution, insinuating without evidence that Western intelligence was behind the unrest. In the lead-up to the big rally in March, he warned of possible violence and had riot police and groups of black-clad government supporters (including notorious football hooligans) positioned in the capital. Minor scuffles occurred. At one point, protesters skirmished with riot police, throwing bottles and fireworks. In response, students immediately stopped the protest and asked people to leave so that the protests and the broader movement remained overwhelmingly peaceful and disciplined, avoiding the trap of provocation. The potential deployment and use of sound cannons against the protesters by the government led to international attention and many calls for a proper investigation into the incident.
Student organisers have stressed nonviolence and creative protest methods such as 15-minute silent blockades (symbolically honouring the 15 victims) in communities nationwide. The decentralised and grassroots character of the protests has made them hard to suppress. Universities have been occupied, local vigils have multiplied and social media has helped citizens coordinate despite a near-monopoly of pro-government media on the airwaves. As of 24 March 2025, Serbia stands at a crossroads. Either the regime yields to some reforms and holds elections under public pressure, or a crackdown and backlash may ensue. For their part, the protesters are determined that this is about more than one collapsed roof. It is about reclaiming democracy in a country sliding into autocracy.
These upheavals in Serbia are unfolding against a wider Balkan backdrop of political flux and frustration. Democratic backsliding and autocratic politics have been on the rise across the region in recent years. In Serbia, after being the minister of information under Milosevic regime (1998–2000), Vučić’s rule since 2012 (first as deputy prime minister and minister of defence, then prime minister and now president) has steadily eroded checks and balances. Media freedom has declined, independent institutions have been packed with loyalists and opposition parties struggle under unfair conditions. Neighbours face similar issues. Bosnia and Herzegovina is paralysed by ethnic division. The hard-line leader of Republika Srpska is openly defying state authority and Western peace overseers. After a brief government turnover, in late 2023 Montenegro saw a coalition of pro-Serbian, pro-Russian parties take power, raising concerns about the Euro–Atlantic trajectory of the country. While more aligned with EU norms, North Macedonia and Albania battle their own corruption and reform fatigue. Throughout the Balkans, faith in liberal democracy has been shaken, a trend that is reflected in the streets of Belgrade, as well as in Skopje in response to a deadly night club fire.
A major sore point is the stalled EU accession process. Once seen as the anchor that would lock in democratic reforms and regional reconciliation across the region, EU membership for Western Balkans countries continues to recede over the horizon. Serbia has been an official EU candidate for more than a decade but talks have stagnated amidst mutual frustration. Brussels has criticized Serbian rule-of-law failures and its refusal to join sanctions on Russia, while Belgrade bristles at EU pressure and the slow pace of rewards. Other countries such as North Macedonia, which even changed its name to satisfy a Greek objection, feel betrayed by endless delays. This has bred public disillusionment. Polls show support for EU membership has decreased in Serbia, dipping near 35% in 2022 and 40% in 2024 compared to 76% in 2009. Many Serbian protesters pointedly do not wave EU flags, seeing Brussels as complicit in propping up Vučić for the sake of stability. This is a stark contrast to pro-EU protests in places such as Georgia and Ukraine.
Indeed, the international reaction to Serbian unrest has been muted. The United States and the EU, typically vocal in supporting pro-democracy movements, have offered almost no public support to Serbian protesters, prioritising ongoing negotiations between Belgrade and Kosovo, access to lithium in Serbia and regional stability over principled stands. In contrast, Russia and China have openly backed Vučić, politically and through state media narratives, framing the protests as illegitimate or chaotic. Building on its historic role in the Non-Aligned Movement, Belgrade has long played a delicate balancing act between the East and the West. It seeks EU investment but maintains close ties with Moscow and Beijing (from purchasing weapons to joint infrastructure projects). This balancing act is now under strain. External powers are effectively tugging at Serbia, with Moscow cheering Vučić’s hard-line stance, while Western actors quietly urge calm and dialogue but stop short of endorsing regime change or mass mobilisation.
At the same time, regional tensions simmer, threatening to intertwine with the domestic crisis in Serbia. The most acute is the Serbia–Kosovo dispute. Talks mediated by the EU (the Brussels Dialogue) have hit one impasse after another and the situation in northern Kosovo remains volatile. In late 2023, a deadly incident in north Kosovo – an armed attack by Serbian paramilitaries on Kosovo police in the village of Banjska – underscored the risk of conflict. Kosovo indicted dozens of Serb participants, including a politically connected figure but Serbia refused to hand suspects over. That episode exacerbated mistrust: Pristina suspects a Belgrade hand in stirring unrest, while Belgrade accuses Pristina of oppressing Kosovo Serbs. As Vučić faces pressure at home, there are fears he might inflame either nationalism or the Kosovo issue to rally support, a time-worn tactic in the Balkans. Thus far, he has made only veiled references. Any flare-up between Serbia and Kosovo could not only derail the protest movement but also plunge the region into crisis.
Elsewhere, old wounds and new political shifts keep the Balkans in flux. In Bosnia, secessionist rhetoric from Serb leaders and calls for Croatian autonomy test the 1995 Dayton Peace framework. In Montenegro, debates over identity and church influence cause turbulence. Even where there is relative calm, young people across the region share common grievances: unemployment, corruption, emigration and a sense that an entrenched political elite (often war-era figures) is failing their future. This has led to grassroots mobilisations beyond Serbia – from environmental protests in Bosnia and Montenegro against destructive hydropower projects, to youth initiatives in Albania fighting corruption. Serbian diaspora across the globe has also come together in solidarity with students, organising support protests, collecting and channelling donations to students, and mediating conversations across divides. All this, accompanied with the fact Western media has been hesitant to report on the protests, suggests that the student movement in Serbia is not just about local corruption but is pointing to the need for a more fundamental system change. Hence, the Serbian uprising is both a product of this regional malaise and a potential catalyst. If the protests succeed in bringing change, this could inspire similar movements in neighbouring societies. If the protests are crushed, this may discourage dissent elsewhere.
Scenario Parallels/Contrasts
The upheaval in Serbia and the wider Balkans reveals a tug-of-war between futures envisioned in the RESPACE scenarios. On one side, elements of a Walls world are clearly visible: President Aleksandar Vučić’s government has centralised power, vilified protesters as foreign backed and shown a willingness to use intimidation in the name of stability. This hardened nationalist stance, even hinting at a crackdown or stirring tensions with Kosovo, is straight out of the Walls playbook, in which authoritarian regimes double down on repression and rally people around old ethnic divisions. Indeed, leaders such as Vučić and his allies in Republika Srpska or the pro-Russia camp in Montenegro form a kind of illiberal bloc propping up one another, mirroring how Walls scenarios see authoritarian rulers reinforcing one another. Great-power meddling amplifies this effect. Russia (and to a degree China) openly backs Vučić’s defiance, while Western governments tread carefully, resulting in a fractured international response that echoes the fragmented world of competing influence in the Walls scenario.
Against this backdrop, the massive Serbian protest movement embodies the opposite impulse, offering a glimpse of a Bridges scenario. Tens of thousands of citizens across social, generational and even ethnic lines have united in a bottom–up push for accountability and democratic change. Moreover, students are making all decisions through plenums, which are direct democracy assemblies. This grassroots energy – students, farmers, professionals, diaspora and even some government officials quietly joining in spirit, along with the way decisions are made – reflects Bridges dynamics of empowered civil society linking people with strong agency across traditional divides. Their disciplined nonviolence and creativity (such as silent vigils in towns nationwide) show the power of civic networks to challenge an authoritarian status quo.
Importantly, this spirit is also starting to transcend borders. Activists and independent journalists across the Balkans are sharing support and information, hinting at a regional solidarity that Bridges fosters. Beyond the region, students are now cycling to Strasbourg to submit letters to the EU parliament and European Court for Human Rights. Along the way, they are calling on people to stand united for the shared cause of transparency and accountability. If this civic awakening can bring tangible reforms in Serbia, it might spark a broader demo effect, inspiring citizens in neighbouring countries and planting seeds for a more connected and just future.
The Serbian crisis also highlights the absence of the robust institutional support expected in a Maze scenario. Maze envisions international actors actively stepping in to uphold democracy and mediate conflicts. In reality, however, the EU and other global institutions have been largely passive. European leaders issue cautious statements and prioritize keeping the Serbia–Kosovo dialogue and lithium negotiations on track over openly backing protester demands. In a true Maze world, the EU might seize this moment to push through a peace deal between Belgrade and Pristina, or deploy election monitors and fast-track integration incentives to encourage reforms. Instead, Serbian EU accession progress remains stalled and there is no high-profile envoy shuttling in to resolve the standoff. This gap between Maze ideals and the on-the-ground response has left the protesters essentially on their own in terms of an international response.
This void is partially filled by competing power dynamics more akin to a Towers scenario. With EU influence divided and hesitant, other towers are pulling Serbia in different directions. Russia and China provide political cover and economic deals to Belgrade, reinforcing a counterweight to EU pressure. Yet again turning Serbia into a geopolitical battlefield, Trump family members have also recently met with Vučić to negotiate investments. At the EU, there is an internal split. Some members such as Hungary champion Vučić, while others push back. This means Europe acts less like a single supportive tower and more like a set of fragmented ones. Regionally, initiatives such as the Open Balkan project suggest that Balkan states could cooperate as their own mini-tower for mutual stability. So far, however, these forums have not been leveraged to address the democratic crisis. The net effect is a multi-player chessboard reminiscent of Towers: no unified front, just a contest of influences shaping Serbian choices.
Serbian turmoil sits at a crossroads of these scenarios. The dark gravity of Walls – authoritarianism, nationalism and old rivalries – is pulling one way, while the hopeful momentum of Bridges – grassroots unity and cross-border civic action – pulls another. Maze-like international engagement is either missing or driven by self-interest. As a result, a disjointed Towers-style struggle for influence has filled that space. The coming months will determine which trajectory prevails. On the one hand, the Balkans may remain locked behind walls of division. On the other, its people may build lasting bridges toward a more collaborative democratic future. The outcome will not only decide the fate of Serbia but will also shape the regional trajectory and test the support of the international community for peaceful change.
Discussion Questions
For Serbian Civic Activists and Youth: How can activists sustain momentum under pressure and broaden their support so the movement stays unified and truly (inter)national? What strategies will translate the street protests into lasting change? For example, should they form a civic platform or prepare to monitor snap elections to ensure a fair outcome?
For Serbian Opposition Parties and Institutions: How can opposition politicians constructively support the goals of this non-partisan protest movement without co-opting its agenda? If a transition or unity government becomes possible, what steps would ensure it addresses protester demands and upholds institutional integrity? For example, involving respected non-partisan figures or safeguarding key bodies such as the electoral commission and courts. How can political decisions include voices from student plenums even if students are not willing to take part in politics?
- For EU and Western Policymakers: Why is the coverage of and support for protests in Serbia, Turkey and Georgia so strikingly different? Should the EU take a stronger stand in support of the pro-democracy movement in Serbia? What forms of engagement (public diplomacy, incentives or sanctions) could help without destabilizing the situation? How can they balance immediate priorities such as the Kosovo dialogue with the longer-term goal of a democratic Balkan region? How is Serbian autonomy perceived in relation to the global fight for critical resources? Could offering Serbia clearer EU membership incentives or conditioning aid on reforms encourage positive change, or would this risk driving Belgrade closer to rival powers?
- For Regional Neighbours and Civil Society: Could a breakthrough in Serbia spark a demo effect in other countries? How might activists and civil society across the Balkans coordinate their efforts – through shared tactics, secure communication or joint campaigns – to push for region-wide democratic reforms? How should neighbouring governments react – by quietly offering mediation or by speaking out against any repression? Could regional initiatives such as the Open Balkan project or the Berlin Process be leveraged to collectively promote good governance as a foundation for stability?
- For International Donors, Media and Watchdogs: How can external supporters of democracy bolster civic space in Serbia without validating government claims of foreign interference? For example, by safely funding independent media, providing legal aid to activists or deploying election monitors to deter fraud and violence. What longer-term investments would help the Western Balkans build a Bridges future?