World at Crossroads: From Scenarios to Action
These short summaries and discussions address highly complex global, regional, and translocal developments occurring up to March 2025, involving numerous actors, perspectives, and nuances. They do not offer comprehensive accounts or detailed analyses, and inevitably may overlook certain events, developments, or viewpoints. Instead, their purpose is to help stakeholders critically engage with the four RESPACE scenarios, stimulating reflection, strategic foresight, and deeper exploration of transformative possibilities for collaboration. Each RESPACE scenario outlines distinct, plausible future pathways but is explicitly not predictive. Users are encouraged to continuously adapt and update these Dialogue Inputs to reflect evolving contexts and emerging understandings.
Escalating Conflict in DR Congo – Extractivism and Regional Intervention
April 2025
Download the article here.
Summary & Context
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is witnessing a dangerous flare up of violence that threatens to spiral into a broader regional war. In the mineral-rich eastern DRC, the rebel group M23 (a Tutsi-led militia) has resumed a major offensive. By early 2025, M23 had seized significant territory in North Kivu, in Goma, the provincial capital, and in Bukavu, the second largest city. There is mounting evidence that Rwanda has been covertly backing the M23 rebellion with troops and weapons. Analysts and UN investigators report that Rwanda sent between 3,000 and 4,000 soldiers into eastern DRC to support M23 operations, despite official denials from Kigali. Uganda is also deeply entangled. Ostensibly, Uganda has forces in DRC to fight other militants but UN experts say Ugandan troops have also aided M23 at times. The Congolese government is struggling to contain the rebellion and enlisted the neighbouring Burundi military, with thousands of Burundian troops crossing into the DRC to help Kinshasa fight M23. This influx of multiple foreign armies evokes the darkest days of the late 1990s African World War that took place on Congolese soil.
The humanitarian toll is staggering since the renewed fighting. At least 7,000 people have been killed in DRC (just since January, according to government estimates) and more than 600,000 civilians have been displaced from their homes. Many have fled repeated massacres and atrocities.
The main drivers of conflict are ethnic tensions and competition over the vast mineral wealth in DRC. Eastern Congo has huge reserves of coltan, cobalt, copper, gold and lithium – critical resources for global technology and green energy industries. These high stakes attract meddling by neighbouring states and even global powers (via proxies), all vying for influence over the minerals trade. Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are faltering. A decades-old UN peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) is present but overstretched and under attack by local protests. Diplomatic agreements such as a Nairobi peace roadmap have repeatedly been violated. So far, sanctions and regional summits have not stopped the combat. The DRC conflict is thus at a perilous juncture, with intensified extractivism and regional rivalries pushing it toward a wider war.
In April 2025, Qatar brokered a tentative truce between Kinshasa and the M23-linked Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), marking the first joint commitment to cease hostilities. However, the agreement unfolds amidst a fragile political landscape in Kinshasa, where President Félix Tshisekedi’s standing is increasingly challenged, and opposition forces leverage the rebellion to gain political ground. On 25 April 2025, under U.S. mediation, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda signed a declaration of principles in Washington, committing to discuss a draft peace agreement on 2 May. Previously, President Tshisekedi had already been seeking to leverage DRC’s vast mineral resources, offering substantial access to its minerals to the United States in return for security assistance. US President Donald Trump appointed businessman Massad Boulos as special envoy to oversee this separate multibillion-dollar minerals-for-support negotiation. Critics caution that this approach may not stabilise eastern DRC, as the US will likely prioritise its economic interests over the kind of deal that could provide sustainable peace and economic opportunities for the Congolese people.
Scenario Parallels/Contrasts
The situation in DRC closely mirrors elements of the Walls scenario – a world of intensifying conflicts and predatory power plays. In Walls, resource extraction from resource-rich countries intensifies and powerful states extend their spheres of influence via force. Rwandan interference in DRC, presumably for economic and strategic gain (access to minerals, regional dominance), exemplifies this dynamic. We also see the multipolar and fragmented world of Walls: multiple states (Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and DRC itself) engaging in a proxy war, with the international community largely unable to coordinate a response. The failure of global governance tools – UN peacekeepers and sanctions – to resolve the crisis is also very Walls-like (global institutions are sidelined). Towers scenario themes are present in a twisted form. Towers envisions rising regional blocs and indeed we see regional involvement in DRC. Instead of cooperative problem-solving, however, it is competitive intervention.
The East African Community and African Union have tried to address the DRC conflict but their efforts are undermined by conflicting interests among member states. In a positive Towers interpretation, African-led solutions are to be expected. Instead, there is African-led escalation, which is a deviation. The plight of local communities and the impotence of civil society in this conflict zone underscore how far reality is from a Bridges world. There is little space for grassroots peace initiatives when villages are being attacked and activists are in danger. In a Bridges scenario, it is possible to imagine that international solidarity movements or local community networks would spotlight suffering in DRC and push for corporate accountability for conflict minerals. In practice, those voices struggle to be heard amidst the chaos. Finally, a Maze contrast: Maze would involve robust UN/AU mediation and perhaps creative governance arrangements for resource sharing – none of which we see succeeding at present. Instead of reforms to manage the resource curse, we see exploitation fuelling war. In particular, the U.S.-brokered declaration of principles between Congo and Rwanda highlights the involvement of external powers in seeking to stabilise the region. While this engagement could potentially lead to increased investment and development, it historically raises concerns about the prioritisation of foreign strategic interests over sustainable peace and local governance. The DRC conflict as of 2025 aligns with the worst aspects of Walls (violent competition over resources, regional and global power meddling) and represents a failure to realise the cooperative visions of Maze, Bridges, or even the constructive side of Towers.
Discussion Questions
- For DRC and Regional Policymakers: What diplomatic or political initiatives could de-escalate the conflict? Can regional organisations such as the African Union or East African Community be more effective peace brokers? For example, through an empowered envoy or peace conference that includes DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and local community representatives. What confidence-building measures (such as jointly monitoring border areas or verifiably withdrawing foreign troops) could be a starting point? Given the trust deficit, is there a role for neutral mediators from outside the region to facilitate a settlement? For example, the UN or other African states with no stake in Congo.
- For International Governance and Donors: How should the international community respond to blatant cross-border interference in DRC? Are stronger sanctions on Rwanda or others (travel bans, asset freezes on leaders or on companies illicitly trading minerals) feasible? Are they likely to change behaviour? Should the UN Security Council consider expanding the mandate or resources of its peacekeepers? Or is a different approach needed (such as an African-led stabilisation force with better legitimacy)? For donor countries funding humanitarian aid in DRC: How can they ensure that aid reaches civilians in need without indirectly enabling armed groups? For instance, aid convoys being taxed by rebels.
- For the Private Sector (Tech and Mining Companies): The minerals driving this conflict end up in smartphones, electric car batteries and other products worldwide. What responsibility do multinational companies have to ensure their sourcing of cobalt, coltan, etc., is not funding conflict? Could they enforce stricter supply chain audits or support initiatives such as certified conflict-free minerals from DRC? Moreover, could companies invest in local development (schools, health, alternative livelihoods) in mining regions to alleviate grievances? If companies simply boycott DRC minerals, that could hurt the livelihoods of local miners. What is the ethical way for businesses to respond in a manner that reduces violence?
- For Civil Society and Activists: Despite the dangerous environment, there are Congolese civil society groups and international NGOs working for peace – from church networks to human rights organisations. How can their efforts be bolstered? For example, can regional civil society (in DRC, Rwanda and Uganda) collaborate to demand a ceasefire or dispel the hate narratives that fuel war? Can global activists campaign for DRC similarly to how they’ve done for other crises? For example, a consumer awareness campaign about blood minerals akin to past blood diamonds campaigns. Also, how can media and activists bring more international attention to what is sometimes called a ‘forgotten conflict’, so that it becomes politically harder for neighbouring governments to continue a secret war?
- For Local Communities: Caught in a geopolitical storm, local communities in eastern Congo have often resorted to their own coping strategies. What role can traditional leaders, women’s groups or youth initiatives play in mitigating conflict at the local level? For instance, are there examples of communities negotiating localised truces with armed factions to protect civilians or arranging safe zones? How can we support those grassroots peacebuilders? For example, through community reconciliation programmes, trauma healing or livelihood support that reduces incentives for young people to join armed groups. Importantly, how can local voices (farmers, displaced people, elders) be included in high-level peace talks so that any deal addresses on-the-ground realities and injustices that drive recruitment into militias?
- For Global Powers (reflection): Although not overt, global powers such as China, the United States and European states have stakes in the DRC outcome. China has large mining investments. Western countries talk of democracy and human rights, while also investing in the mining sector. What are the long-term implications if this conflict continues or worsens? Could it destabilise the wider Central African region – affect stability in Rwanda or Uganda? Might external powers become more directly involved, as occurred in Cold War-era Congo conflicts? Stakeholders should consider if a hands-off approach now could lead to a larger crisis later. And thus whether proactive diplomatic investment now is in the interest of everyone to prevent another regional war.
- For All Stakeholders (Towards Alternative Infrastructures for Collaboration): Given the clear inadequacies of traditional conflict resolution approaches (such as peacekeeping operations, sanctions and diplomatic summits) to sustainably resolve the cyclical violence in DRC, what kind of alternative collaborative spaces or infrastructures could be envisioned to address the deep-rooted drivers of conflict (extractivism, ethnic polarisation, regional competition)? How can diverse actors – including local communities, regional organisations, global civil society and private-sector stakeholders – begin immediately to co-create these alternative platforms or mechanisms? Specifically, starting now, what practical steps can each of these actors take to help move away from reactionary crisis responses and toward sustainable, inclusive and transformative peace infrastructures in the medium and long term?