World at Crossroads: From Scenarios to Action
These short summaries and discussions address highly complex global, regional, and translocal developments occurring up to March 2025, involving numerous actors, perspectives, and nuances. They do not offer comprehensive accounts or detailed analyses, and inevitably may overlook certain events, developments, or viewpoints. Instead, their purpose is to help stakeholders critically engage with the four RESPACE scenarios, stimulating reflection, strategic foresight, and deeper exploration of transformative possibilities for collaboration. Each RESPACE scenario outlines distinct, plausible future pathways but is explicitly not predictive. Users are encouraged to continuously adapt and update these Dialogue Inputs to reflect evolving contexts and emerging understandings.
Sahel Coups and Conflicts – Rift with ECOWAS and the AU
May 2025
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Summary & Context
The Sahel region of West Africa has been experiencing a profound upheaval. In the past few years, a series of military coups swept through Mali (2020, 2021), Burkina Faso (2022) and Niger (2023), toppling governments that were struggling against Islamist insurgencies. By late 2024, these three junta-led states had formed a tight alliance with one another, defying diplomatic pressure from their neighbours. Tensions with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) hit a breaking point. On 29 January 2025, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger formally announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS, which the regional bloc subsequently recognised. This schism came after ECOWAS had sanctioned these regimes and even threatened military intervention, especially after the Niger coup, to restore constitutional order. The juntas accuse ECOWAS of being a tool of former colonial powers and failing to protect their countries from terrorism.
Many locals in Mali and Burkina have rallied in support of the juntas, viewing them as protectors of sovereignty – evidenced by public demonstrations in those countries cheering the departure of French troops. The three countries have proclaimed what they call a new ‘Alliance of Sahel States’ (also known by its French acronym, AES). This is essentially a security and mutual defence pact among the coup governments. However, they have proclaimed an interest in economic integration and the creation of a common currency. The Togolese foreign minister recently indicated that there could be a possibility for Togo to join AES, which would provide them with sea access. AES governments have also sought closer relationships with global powers such as Russia, Turkey and Iran for partnerships, looking beyond their traditional French and American allies. The conflicts in these Sahel nations rage on. Militant Islamist groups (most linked to Al-Qaeda and ISIS) control large swaths of territory and carry out frequent attacks on soldiers and civilians. The humanitarian emergency is dire. In 2024, roughly 10 million children across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger were in extreme need of aid. Violence has displaced hundreds of thousands, disrupted farming and markets, and caused widespread food insecurity. The departure of Western forces (France ended its anti-terror operations and was told to pull troops out of Niger and Mali) and the entrance of mercenaries (such as the Russian Wagner Group in Mali) have reshuffled the security landscape without yet defeating the insurgents. In sum, the Sahel faces intensified internal conflicts and a breakdown of regional diplomatic relations, raising fears of growing instability that could spill into coastal West African states.
Scenario Parallels/Contrasts
Developments in the Sahel strongly echo the Walls scenario trajectory, especially regarding the fracturing of international cooperation and the rise of authoritarian rule. In a Walls-like fashion, the post-coup governments are retreating from broader collaboration and rejecting external norms. The scenario text notes polarisation between former colonial powers and post-colonial states. It also indicates many such states distancing themselves from the global governance architecture on the grounds of persistent disillusion. This is almost exactly what Mali, Burkina and Niger have done by quitting ECOWAS/AU frameworks and denouncing France and the UN. These regimes also prioritise military solutions and sovereignty above human rights or democracy – again matching the authoritarian tilt in the Walls scenario.
The creation of the Sahel alliance can be seen through the Towers lens: a new regional bloc born out of shared identity (Sahelian, anti-colonial) and the quest for self-reliance in security. The Towers scenario envisions stronger (sub)regional groupings stepping up as Western influence wanes. In the ideal Towers scenario, however, those blocs cooperate for stability. Here, the Sahel alliance is confrontational (positioning itself against ECOWAS, the AU and Western actors) and its effectiveness in solving problems is unproven. The situation is antithetical to Maze. Instead of recommitting to multilateral governance, these states have broken away from it. It is also averse to Bridges. Civic space in these countries is shrinking; for example, the junta in Mali has cracked down on media and NGOs. Bottom–up peace efforts such as community dialogues with jihadists or local ceasefires struggle to gain traction when the governments themselves are pursuing all-out war and facing sanctions. Faint Bridges elements can be found in the pan-African solidarity rhetoric some of these regimes use – they claim to speak for the people’s anti-imperialist sentiments – but these are top–down juntas, not grassroots movements, so it rings somewhat hollow for now. Overall, the Sahel conflicts and ECOWAS rift align with Walls (authoritarian regimes, international norms breakdown) and partially Towers (new regionalism driven by anti-West sentiment), while representing a failure of the cooperative conflict resolution that Maze or Bridges would pursue.
Discussion Questions
For ECOWAS and the AU: How should regional institutions deal with member states that not only undergo coups but then reject the institution itself? Is there a way to reopen dialogue with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to avoid a permanent rupture? For instance, can ECOWAS offer a pathway back (perhaps revised timelines for transitions to civilian rule or security assistance against terrorism that does not infringe sovereignty) that addresses the grievances voiced by the juntas? More broadly, do these events indicate a need for reform in ECOWAS and the AU? For example, to make them more responsive to the security concerns of Sahelian states or the perceptions of neo-colonial bias. Or should ECOWAS hold firm on principles even if it means a split, to deter future coups elsewhere?
For the Alliance of Sahel States Governments: What is the long-term plan of Mali, Burkina and Niger under military rule? They face the same or worse security and development problems as before. Can their new partnerships with Russia and others truly substitute for cooperation with neighbours and Western donors? For example, if Wagner mercenaries help in the short term but commit abuses, does it actually weaken extremist recruitment or strengthen it? These leaders claim to be championing sovereignty but how will they deliver tangible improvements (peace, jobs, services) to their populations? What benchmarks should they set to judge if this new approach is working? For example, reduced violence in one to two years or successful offensives against insurgents, etc. Or is a rethink needed?
For International Partners and Donors: Many traditional donors (in Europe and the United States) have cut off development aid and military training to these junta-led states, while humanitarians warn that civilians are suffering. How can the world balance not abandoning vulnerable populations with not legitimising coups? Is it feasible to route aid through local NGOs or the UN to bypass coup governments? Do these approaches ultimately get blocked by those governments? Also, what are the implications of these states teaming up with US rivals? Should Western countries engage more diplomatically to avoid ceding all influence? Could quiet diplomacy with the juntas prevent atrocities or at least keep some humanitarian corridors open?
For Peace and Security Actors: With insurgencies still rampant, what innovative approaches might bring peace to the Sahel? The current trajectory is heavy militarization but past years show that a purely military approach has not defeated jihadists, who often embed in local conflicts and grievances. Could there be a role for dialogue with some extremist factions or community-level pacts that the new regimes might consider (even if quietly)? What about the role of regional powers such as Algeria or Chad: Can they act as intermediaries or contribute troops to an African-led peace enforcement mission that the Sahel governments would accept? In essence, what conflict resolution measures short of full counter-insurgency warfare might reduce violence? Can the new alliance leverage any of them?
For Civil Society and Local Communities: In these Sahel countries, civic actors (human rights groups, journalists, village councils, women’s associations) face a two-fold threat: jihadist violence and tighter restrictions from the military regimes. How can they navigate this space to help their communities? Are there examples of local negotiation with militants to spare villages or examples of civic leaders dissuading youth from joining extremist groups that could be built upon? What support do they need – perhaps legal protection, psychosocial support or discreet funding – from the international community to continue their work? Also, as these countries isolate from ECOWAS, civil society networks across borders (for example, West African scholars, NGOs spanning Ghana, Senegal, etc., and the Sahel) might become more important for sharing information and solidarity. How can those ties be maintained when official ties are cut?
For Activists and Pan-African Movements: The narrative of resistance against imperialism that the Sahel juntas use does resonate with some publics in Africa, who are frustrated with how little progress (if any) years of Western security involvement has brought. Activists elsewhere (such as in Francophone Africa) have held rallies supporting the coups, seeing them as a reclaiming of sovereignty. Moving forward, how can activists channel this anti-colonial sentiment into something that directly benefits people’s lives? Is there an opportunity for a third-way people’s movement that is neither beholden to foreign powers nor to military authoritarians? For example, pushing for genuine self-determination through democratic means and local development. In the longer term, what will it take to address the root issues that gave rise to both jihadism and coups – such as extreme poverty, climate change impacts on farmers, ethnic marginalisation, corruption of prior regimes – so that the Sahel can move towards stability?